This paper considers an exchange economy with a measure space of agents and consumption externalities, which take into account two possible external effects in consumers' preferences: the dependence upon prices and other agents' consumptions, respectively, as in Greenberg et al. [12] and Khan and Vohra [15] (see also Balder [4] for a general discussion). This allows to cover a general model of reference coalitions externalities, in which the agents' preferences are influenced by the global (or the mean) consumption of the agents in the finitely many reference coalitions. Our paper provides a general existence theorem of equilibria that extends previous results by Schmeidler [21] , in the case of fixed reference coalitions and Noguchi [17] , for a more particular concept of reference coalitions.
Introduction 1
This paper considers consumption externalities in an exchange economy with a measure space of agents and takes into account two external effects in consumers' preferences: the dependence upon prices and upon other agents' consumptions. This question has been extensively studied in the case of finitely many agents (see, for example the book by Laffont [16] ) and the case of a measure space of consumers had a recent revival of interest since the article by Balder [4] pointing out the inherent difficulties in this framework.
1
The price dependence externality is a long recognized problem, which found recently new applications in the study of financial markets, where a two-period temporary equilibrium model has a reduced form as a Walrasian model with price dependent preferences. For the existence of equilibria in economies with a measure space of agents and price externalities we refer to Greenberg et al. [12] , who use the concept of "abstract economies" introduced by Arrow and Debreu [1] .
The dependence upon other agents' consumptions has also been considered in the last years, with attempts to extend the equilibrium existence result with interdependent preferences by Shafer and Sonnenschein [18] . We mention the paper of Khan and Vohra [15] , which uses also the same concept of "abstract economies" as in [18] and we refer to Balder [4] for a discussion on the limitations of the assumptions made in [15] .
In the present paper we propose a model with "finitely many externality effects", i.e., formally, the externality space E is assumed to be a subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space and the externality e ∈ E summarizes the externality effects coming both from the dependence upon prices and other agents' consumptions. Thus, the preferences of each agent a may depend upon the externality e ∈ E and we denote by ≺ a,e her preference relation. Formally, an externality mapping Φ is given, and this mapping associates to each agent a, each price p and each (integrable) consumption allocation f , the externality e = Φ(a, p, f ) ∈ E, which influences agent a's preferences, in the sense that the equilibrium choice of agent a will be made with the preference relation ≺ a,Φ(a,p,f ) . The consideration of finitely many externality effects makes an explicit restriction on the couples (p, f ) of prices and (integrable) consumption allocation that can influence agents' preferences via the externality mapping Φ. The previous model contains, in particular, the case of reference coalitions externalities that we will now present. Let (A, A, ν) be the measure space of consumers, then the reference coalitions model associates to each agent a and each price p, finitely many reference coalitions C k (a, p) ∈ A (k = 1, . . . , K), which may influence the tastes of agents a in one of the two following ways. Each coalition C k (a, p) ∈ A can be considered as the reference class of agent a for a particular group of commodities, say clothes, music, housing, travels... The externality dependence operates via reference consumption vectors (for the particular group of commodities) which can be obtained either as the total or as the mean consumption of agents in the reference coalition of agent a. With a single reference coalition (i.e. K = 1), the externality mapping can be written as follows in the cases of total (resp. mean) consumption dependence:
For a measure space (A, A, ν), we recall that a measurable setĀ ∈ A is called an atom if ν(Ā) > 0 and for every C ∈ A such that C ⊂Ā, one has [ν(C) = 0 or ν(Ā \ C) = 0] and we denote by A na the nonatomic part of A, that is, the complementary in A of the union of all the atoms of A. We denote also by L 1 (A, IR H ) the space of equivalence classes of integrable mappings from A to IR H and we let f 1 := A f (a) dν(a), which defines a norm on L 1 (A, IR H ). The space L 1 (A, IR H ) will be endowed with two different topologies, the norm topology defined by the norm f 1 and the weak topology σ(L 1 , L ∞ ); we recall that a sequence {f n } converges weakly to f if and only if sup n f
The existence result for general externality mappings
We present the list of assumptions that the economy (E, Φ) will be required to satisfy. Assumption A The measure space (A, A, ν) is positive, finite, complete and L 1 (A, IR H ) is separable for the norm topology; Assumption C [Consumption Side] for a.e. a ∈ A and every (e, x) ∈ E × X(a): (i) E is a subset of a Euclidian space IR K and X(a) is a closed, convex subset of IR H + ; (ii)[Irreflexivity and transitivity] ≺ a,e is irreflexive 3 and transitive 4 ; (iii)[Convexity of preferences on atoms] if a belongs to some atomĀ of A, then the set {x ∈ X(a) | not[x ≺ a,e x]} is convex; (iv)[Continuity] the sets {x ∈ X(a) | x ≺ a,e x } and {(x , e ) ∈ X(a) × E | x ≺ a,e x} are open, respectively, in X(a) and in X(a) × E (for their relative topologies); (v)[Measurability] the consumption set correspondence a → X(a ) and the preference correspondence (a , e ) →≺ a ,e are measurable 5 ; (vi) ω ∈ L X , i.e., ω : A → IR H is integrable and ω(a ) ∈ X(a ) for a.e. a ∈ A; Assumption M(i)[Monotonicity] for a.e. a ∈ A, X(a) := IR H + and for every e ∈ E and every x, x in X(a), x < x implies x ≺ a,e x ;
The above assumptions are standard and need no special comments. In a model without externalities (say E = {0}), they coincide with Aumann-Schmeidler's assumptions, as discussed in the next section.
The next assumption concerns the externality mapping.
Without any risk of confusion, this allows us to consider Φ as a mapping Φ :
EC[Caratheodory] E is a subset of a Euclidean space IR K and the mapping Φ is Caratheodorytype, i.e., (i) for every (p, f ) ∈ IR H + × L X , the mapping a → Φ(a, p, f ) is measurable on A and (ii) for a.e. a ∈ A and for every sequence {p n } ⊂ IR H + converging to p and every integrably bounded 6 sequence {f n } ⊂ L X converging weakly to f , the sequence {Φ(a, p n , f n )} converges to Φ(a, p, f ); n , is said to be A−measurable if its graph is a measurable set, i.e., G F := {(a, x) ∈ A × IR H | x ∈ F (a)} belongs to A ⊗ B(IR n ), where B(IR n ) denotes the σ−algebra of Borel subsets of IR n and A ⊗ B(IR n ) the σ−algebra product. The preference correspondence (a, e) →≺ a,e is measurable in the sense that the correspondence (a, e) → {(x, x ) ∈ X(a) × X(a) | x ≺ a,e x } is A ⊗ B(E)−measurable.
6 that is, for some integrable function ρ :
bounded, then, for every a ∈ A, there exists a subsequence of {Φ(a, p n , f n )} which is bounded in E.
The above Caratheodory assumption is a standard regularity assumption. The boundedness assumption, which is the key assumption of the model, will be satisfied in the reference coalitions model presented hereafter. We point out that EB is also satisfied when the correspondence a → X(a) is integrably bounded (see Assumption IB hereafter) and C and EC hold.
The last assumption strengthen the convexity of preferences, which needs to be assumed also on the nonatomic part in the general case (see Section 2.3 for a weakening of this assumption and the meaning of its notation). Assumption ECL 0 for a.e. a ∈ A na and every (e, x) ∈ E × X(a), the set {x ∈ X(a) | not[x ≺ a,e x]} is convex.
We can now state our first existence result.
Theorem 2.1
The exchange economy with externalities (E,Φ) admits an equilibrium (f * , p * ) with p * >> 0, if it satisfies Assumptions A, C, M, E and ECL 0 .
The above Theorem 2.1 is a direct consequence of a more general result [Theorem 2.2] that will be stated in the following section, which is devoted to the weakening of the convexity assumption ECL 0 .
Weakening the convexity assumption ECL 0
Since Aumann [2] , most of the existence results in models without externalities (say E = {0}) do not assume the convexity of the preferences on the nonatomic part A na of the measure space of consumers (i.e., Assumption ECL 0 ). Without Assumption ECL 0 , the above existence result may not be true in a general model with externalities.
The aim of this section is to show, however, that we can weaken the convexity assumption ECL 0 to encompass the known results of the literature in the three following important cases. [19] , Hildenbrand [13] ] E 1 = {0} and the mapping Φ 1 :
where the sets C k (k = 1, . . . , K) are nonempty measurable subsets of A na , which are pairwise disjoint, i.e., C j ∩ C k = ∅ for every j = k.
In the three above cases, the externality mappings Φ i (i = 1, 2, 3) satisfy the Lyapunov property on A na , in the sense that, for C = A na and Φ = Φ i the following holds (see Proposition 2.1 for the proof):
Lyapunov property of Φ on C: for a.e. a ∈ A and every p ∈ IR
We now can state our main existence result, which extends Theorem 2.1 and allows also to cover the three above cases E 1 , E 2 , E 3 . For this, we need to introduce a new Convexity-Lyapunov Assumption, which is clearly satisfied in the two important cases: (i) convexity of the preferences on A na (i.e., Assumption ECL 0 of Theorem 2.1), and (ii) Lyapunov property of Φ on A na .
Theorem 2.2
The exchange economy with externalities (E,Φ) admits an equilibrium (f * , p * ) with p * >> 0, if it satisfies Assumptions A, C, M, E, together with the following one: Assumption ECL There exists a measurable set C ⊂ A na such that: (i) the preferences are convex 7 on A na \ C and (ii) the externality mapping Φ satisfies the Lyapunov property on C.
We end this section with a proposition showing that, in the three above cases E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , the externality mappings Φ i (i = 1, 2, 3) satisfy Assumption ECL, and also a stronger Assumption ECL (in which no convexity assumption on preferences is made).
Proposition 2.1 (a) In the three above cases E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , the externality mappings Φ = Φ i (i = 1, 2, 3) satisfy the following assumption: ECL There exists a measurable set C ⊂ A na such that: (i) the externality mapping Φ only depends on f |C , in the sense that, Φ(a, p, f ) = Φ(a, p, g), if f |C = g |C , and (ii) the externality mapping Φ satisfies the Lyapunov property on C. (b) If Assumption ECL holds, then Φ satisfies the Lyapunov property on A na , hence Assumption ECL holds.
Proof. (a) Assumption ECL is satisfied for C = A na for the cases E 1 and E 2 and for
This is a consequence of Lyapunov's theorem, applied to A na in the first two cases and applied successively to each C i (i = 1, . . . , N ) in the latter case.
(b) We show that the externality mapping Φ satisfies the Lyapunov property on A na . Indeed, for a.e. a ∈ A and every p ∈ IR H + , let {f i } i∈I ⊂ L X (I finite) and f ∈ L X such that, for a.e. α ∈ A na , f (α) ∈ co{f i (α) | i ∈ I}. Then, for a.e. α ∈ C, f (α) ∈ co{f i (α) | i ∈ I} and, since Φ satisfies the Lyapunov property on C (by ECL ), there exists an integrable mapping f :
We consider now the mapping f * :
for every α ∈ C, f * (α) = f (α) for every α ∈ A na \ C and f * (α) = f (α) for every α ∈ A \ A na and we note that, for a.e. α ∈ A na , f * (α) ∈ {f i (α) | i ∈ I} and for a.e.
3 The reference coalitions model
The model and the existence result
The general model of an exchange economy with externalities (E, Φ) allows us to consider the reference coalitions model that we now present as an extension of the Schmeidler's model. We suppose that, given a price p ∈ IR H + , each agent a has finitely many reference coalitions of agents, C k (a, p) ∈ A (k = 1 . . . K), whose consumption choices influence the preferences of agent a in a way defined precisely hereafter. Hence, the reference coalitions may depend upon the agent and also on the price that prevails; this differs from Schmeidler's model, in which the reference coalitions are constant. We will assume that each agent a is influenced either by the global consumption or by the mean consumption of agents in the coalition C k (a, p).
The "global dependence" case is characterized by the externality space E := (IR H + ) K and the externality mapping Φ C 1 :
The "mean dependence" case, is characterized by the externality space E := (IR H + ) K and the externality mapping Φ C 2 :
The reference coalitions model can thus be summarized by the exchange economies with externalities (E, Φ C 1 ) and (E, Φ C 2 ), where
and the externality mappings Φ C 1 and Φ C 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in Section 3.2.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first show that the mapping
is measurable. We notice that the mappings (a, α) → f (α) and (a, α) → χ C(a,p) (α) are both measurable on A × A (endowed with the product σ−algebra A ⊗ A), from the fact that f ∈ L 1 (A, IR H + ) and Assumption R(iv) respectively. Hence, the mapping (a, α) → χ C(a,p) (α)f (α) is measurable on A × A.
Since χ C(a,p) (α)f (α) ≤ f (α) for a.e. (a, α) ∈ A × A and f ∈ L 1 (A, IR H + ), applying Fubini's theorem, the mapping
is correctly defined and is measurable on A. Hence, the mapping Φ C 1 satisfies Assumption EC(i).
We now show that the mapping
is measurable on A. Using the above argument for f = 1, we deduce that the mapping a → ν[C(a, p)] is measurable on A, hence the mapping a → 1 ν[C(a,p)] is also measurable on A, since ν[C(a, p)] > 0 for every a ∈ A (by R(i)). Then, in view of the measurability property of Φ C 1 , the mapping Φ C 2 satisfies Assumption EC(i). [EC(ii)]: For every a ∈ A and for every sequence {p n } converging to p in IR H + and every integrably bounded sequence {f n } converging weakly to f in L X , the sequence {Φ C i (a, p n , f n )} converges to Φ C i (a, p, f ) (i = 1, 2).
Let a ∈ A and let {(p n , f n )} as above. We first prove that Φ C 1 satisfies [EC(ii)], i.e.,
For this, one notices that
For the second term, since {f n } converges weakly to f , one has
For the first term we have
recalling that the sequence {f n } is integrably bounded, hence, for some integrably function ρ : A → IR + , one has sup n f n (a) ≤ ρ(a) for a.e. a ∈ A. Moreover, ν[C(a, p n )∆C(a, p)] → 0 when p n → p (by R(iii)), hence
since the mapping C → C ρ(α)dν(α), from A to IR + , is a positive measure, absolutely continuous with respect to ν. This implies that the first term converges to zero 8 and ends the proof that Φ C 1 satisfies [EC(ii)]. We now prove that Φ C 2 satisfies [EC(ii)] and we recall that
8 Note: We don't need to use the fact that the sequence {f n } is integrably bounded. Indeed, if {f n } converges weakly to f and ν[C(a, p n )∆C(a, p)] → 0, one has directly
For details, see Dunford and Schwartz [9] p.294. Thanks to E. Balder for this remark.
Since Φ C 1 (a, p n , f n ) → Φ C 1 (a, p, f ) and since, for every p ∈ IR
which converges to zero (by R(iii)) when p n → p.
is a (norm-)bounded sequence, then for every a ∈ A there exists a subsequence of {Φ C i (a, p n , f n )} (i = 1, 2) which is bounded in IR H + . Let {(p n , f n )} as above. For every a ∈ A and for every n, one has
Since {f n } is norm-bounded and f n ≥ 0, we deduce that for some m ≥ 0
We now prove that Φ C 2 (a, p n , f n ) is bounded. Indeed, from above, we get
.
Since the sequence {p n } is bounded there exists a subsequence {p n k } which converges to some element p ∈ IR H + . We recall that, in the previous step, we have proved that, for every a ∈ A,
Noguchi's reference coalitions model
We now present Noguchi's model (see [17] ) and we deduce his existence result from Theorem 3.1. It can be described by a reference coalition model, with a unique reference coalition C N (a, p), defined, for each consumer a at price system p, by
+ is a fixed function and I(ω(a), δ(a), p) is a subset of IR. For Noguchi, "intuitively speaking, I(ω(a), δ(a), p) represents (for agent a) an income range in the income-scale, relative to income p · ω(a) and with magnitude p · δ(a)" and among the examples given, we point out the following one defined by the interval I(ω(a), δ(a), p) = (p · ω(a) + p · δ(a), ∞).
We now state the existence result. 
Proof. We define the reference coalitions C := (C(a, p)) (a,p)∈A×I R H by
Consequently, every equilibrium of (E, Φ C 2 ) is an equilibrium for (E, Φ C N 2 ). We now obtain the existence of equilibria of (E, Φ C 2 ) from Theorem 3.1 (K = 1) and it suffices to prove that the reference coalitions C, defined above, satisfy Assumption R of Theorem 3.1. This is proved in Section 5.2 of the Appendix.
4
Proof of the existence theorem
Proof of Theorem 2.2 in the integrably bounded case
In this section, we provide an intermediary existence result, also of interest for itself, under the following additional assumption:
The correspondence a → X(a), from A to IR H + , is integrably bounded, that is, for some integrable function ρ : A → IR + , sup x∈X(a) x ≤ ρ(a) for a.e. a ∈ A. 9 In fact, Noguchi [17] only assumed that ν[C(a, p)] > 0 for every (a, p) ∈ A × IR H + such that p · ω(a) > 0. To be able to get Noguchi's existence result in the more general case, we need to weaken Assumption R of Theorem 3.1 and, also, Assumption E of Theorem 2.2 as in the working paper [8] .
Theorem 4.1 Under Assumptions A, C, EC, ECL and IB, the economy (E, Φ) admits a free disposal quasi-equilibrium (f * , p * ) ∈ L X × IR H with p * > 0, that is:
for a.e. a ∈ A such that p * · ω(a) > inf p * · X(a), f * (a) is a maximal element for ≺ a,e * a in the budget set B(a, p * ) where e * a := Φ(a, p * , f * );
To prepare the proof of Theorem 4.1, we define the "quasi-demand" correspondence D,
We let ∆ :
The next lemmas summarize the properties of the set L X of consumption allocations and of the correspondence Γ. Proof of Lemma 4.1. First, the set L X is nonempty, since it contains the mapping ω; indeed ω ∈ L 1 (A, IR H ) and, for a.e. a ∈ A, ω(a) ∈ X(a) (by C(vi)). The set L X is also convex, since for a.e. a ∈ A, X(a) is a convex set (by C(i)).
We show now that L X is compact for the weak topology of L 1 (A, IR H ). From the fact that the correspondence a → X(a) is integrably bounded (by IB), the set L X is (norm-)bounded and uniformly integrable and consequently L X is weakly sequentially compact (see, for example, Dunford and Schwartz [9] , p.294). In view of Eberlein-Smulian's Theorem, this is equivalent to the fact that the weak closure of L X is weakly compact. The proof will be complete if we show that L X is weakly closed. But in the normed space L 1 (A, IR H ), the convex set L X is weakly closed if and only if it is closed in the norm topology of L 1 (A, IR H ) (see, for example, Dunford and Schwartz [9] , p.422). To show that L X is closed, we consider a sequence {f n } ⊂ L X which converges to some f ∈ L 1 (A, IR H ) for the norm topology of L 1 (A, IR H ), then there exists a subsequence {f n k }, which converges almost everywhere to f . But, for a.e. a ∈ A, f n k (a) ∈ X(a), since f n k ∈ L X . Taking the limit when k → ∞, for a.e. a ∈ A, f (a) ∈ X(a), since X(a) is a closed set (by C(i)). This ends the proof that L X is weakly compact.
Finally, L X is metrizable (for the weak topology) since, in a separable Banach space, the weak topology on a weakly compact set is metrizable (see, for example, Dunford and Schwartz [9] , p.434). 
For the first term one gets
since p n → p and {f n } is integrably bounded by ρ (from IB and the fact that {f n } ⊂ L X ). For the second term one has 
The existence of a measurable selection of the correspondence
is a consequence of Aumann's Theorem and it suffices to show that (i) for a.e. a ∈ A, D(a) = ∅ and (ii) the correspondence D(.) is measurable. The first assertion is a consequence of Proposition 5.1 of the Appendix. We now prove the second assertion. Indeed,
where 
, which ends the proof of Assertion (ii). Finally, every measurable selection of the correspondence a → D(a) is integrable, since from Assumption IB, for a.e. a ∈ A, D(a) ⊂ B(0, ρ(a)) for some integrable function ρ. This shows that Γ 2 (p, f ) is nonempty.
We now show that the correspondence Γ 2 has a closed graph. Indeed (recalling that L X is metrizable), let {(p n , f n , g n )} be a sequence converging to some element
Since the sequence {g n } is integrably bounded (by IB) and converges weakly to g in L 1 (A, IR H ), it is a standard result [see, for example, Yannelis [22] ] that for a.e. a ∈ A, g(a) ∈ co Ls{g n (a)}.
But, for a.e. a ∈ A, the correspondence (p, f ) → coD(a, p, Φ(a, p, f )) has a closed graph and convex values, since the correspondence (p, e) → D(a, p, e) has a closed graph and convex values [Proposition 5.1 of Appendix] and the mapping (p, f ) → Φ(a, p, f ) is continuous on ∆ × L X (by EC(ii), IB and the metrizability of L X ). Hence, recalling that, for a.e. a ∈ A, g n (a) ∈ coD(a, p n , Φ(a, p n , f n )) for all n, the closed graph property implies Ls{g n (a)} ⊂ coD(a, p, Φ(a, p, f )).
Consequently, for a.e. a ∈ A g(a) ∈ co Ls{g n (a)} ⊂ coD(a, p, Φ(a, p, f )), which shows that g ∈ Γ(p, f ) and ends the proof of the lemma. From the three above lemmas, recalling that the Cartesian product of two correspondences with closed graph and non-empty, convex, compact values is a correspondence with closed graph and non-empty, convex, compact values (see Berge [6] p.121), the space L := IR H × L 1 (A, IR H ), the set K := ∆ × L X and the correspondence Γ satisfy all the assumptions of the following fixed-point theorem [see, for example, Fan [10] and Glicksberg [11] ]. Theorem 4.2 (Fan-Glicksberg) Let K be a non-empty, convex, compact subset of a Haussdorf locally convex space L and let Γ be a correspondence, from K to K, with a closed graph and non-empty, convex, compact values. Then there exists x ∈ K such that x ∈ Γ(x).
Consequently, there exists an element (p, f ) ∈ ∆ × L X satisfying:
f (a) ∈ coD(a, p, Φ(a, p, f )) for a.e. a ∈ A.
The following lemma shows that we can remove the convex hull in the above assertion.
Since (p k , f k ) is a free-disposal quasi-equilibrium for (E k , Φ k ), one has ∀k ∈ IN, ∃t k ∈ Q n , t k − g(α) < 1 k and t k ∈ F (f (a)).
Consequently
which is measurable since the set {α ∈ A | t − g(α) < 1 k } is measurable (since the mapping g is measurable) and the set {a ∈ A | t ∈ F (f (a))} is measurable (since the set F −1 (t) is measurable and the mapping f is measurable).
